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POLEMIC IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Jurisprudence, used as a technical term, has two meanings of 
equal currency, referring both to a philosophy of law and a science 
which "treats of the principles of positive law and legal relations." 1 
These meanings are vastly different in import. "Philosophy" sug-
gests speculation and ideology, while "science" suggests fact and 
functionalism. Jurisprudence, like any discipline of observation 
and conclusion, can be a very useful tool in the legal analysis of 
one's own work and the work of others. The science, with its 
clear sight and objective standards, is obviously more dependable 
than the polemics of philosophy, and therefore the sole approach 
to be used in situations that demand objectivity. If any area of 
jurisprudence demands this objectivity, it is the area of judicial 
decision. It is the premise of this Comment that much of what is 
written about legal judgments, and often the judgments them-
selves, contain so much polemic that they sometimes produce 
results contrary to a primary function of legal systems, the settle-
ment of disputes. This is an especially critical problem in the inter-
national sphere, where the tendency to mix fact and polemic often 
detracts from the legal justifications of a particular dispute's resolu-
tion. 
The most recent decision of the International Court of Justice, 
the 1974 Icelandic Fisheries Cases2-the actions of the United King-
dom and the Federal Republic of Germany against Iceland for the 
unilateral extension of Icelandic coastal fisheries jurisdiction3-will 
be used to illustrate the confusion of fact with polemic. That Court 
divided, not over the finding for Applicants, but over the techniques 
that should have been used to reach that finding. There were several 
lesser issues of fact and law, but the major controversy was one of 
approach. While most jurisprudential questions can be stated in 
terms of objective criteria, debate can often degenerate to philo-
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 992 (4th rev. ed. 1968). 
2. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of.Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 175. An edited copy of the Judgments may be found in 13 lNT'L LEGAL 
MAT'Ls 1049-114 (1974). 
3. For the background of the dispute see Evans, Judicial Decisions, Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice under compromissory clause in exchange of notes, 67 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 547, 563 (1973); Tiewul, The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (1973) and the Ghost of 
Rebus Sic Stantibus, 6 N.Y.U.J. lNT'L L. & PoL. 455 (1973); 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 512 
(1973). 
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sophical argumentation, i.e. position statements. Polemic questions 
of what might be called judicial style should be left in chambers 
and not written into the decisions of a world court. The intention 
of this Comment is not to malign jurisprudence, but to attempt to 
serve as a gadfly with the hope of provoking a more rigorous use of 
this important discipline. The presentation will consist of a brief 
historical background of western jurisprudence, followed by an anal-
ysis of the major points of contention in the Icelandic Fisheries 
decisions, closing with some speculation as to the causes and conse-
quences of the use of polemic in and by a world court. 4 
II. HISTORY 
Although jurisprudence has long been the most abstruse and 
complex of the social disciplines-a sort of practical man's meta-
physics-areas of general agreement, or schools, have been de-
marked by jurisprudents. Traditionally, there have been four basic 
divisions (although countless subdivisions are possible): natural-
law, historical, formalist or analytic and realist schools.5 
The natural-law or philosophical school has been the most long-
lived and influential historically, although it seems to have fewer 
adherents today. From Aristotle to the present, the search for a 
complete system of legal and ethical concepts that mirror man's 
assumedly rational nature8 has been a Holy Grail that has tempted 
many. However, absolute justice in the abstract has often proven 
such a pliable concept that vastly different positions have found 
shelter under its umbrella. Both democracy and dictatorship have 
been justified in its name with equal conviction.7 
The historical school, originally a German conceptualization of 
the Volksgeist, or spirit of the people, was in conscious opposition 
to natural law. 8 Both anti-rational and anti-abstractionist, the 
4. In response to the possible charge that this condemnation of polemic is itself very 
argumentative, the reply can only be that all attempts to insure dispassionate analysis have 
been made, and that student comments are not judicial decrees; they cannot coerce compli-
ance. 
5. J. RoSENBERG, JEROME FRANK: JURIST AND PHILOSOPHER 1 (1970). 
6. Id. at 1-2. 
7. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 348 (1950) . 
8. An extensive outline of the historical school, its roots and branches, can be found in 
a three-part article by Dean Roscoe Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 
557 (1937), 51 HARV. L. REV. 444, 777 (1938). This article also touches upon the other schools 
of jurisprudence, including realism. However, considering the debate between Pound and the 
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school modeled itself not after man's natural reason but after his 
social institutions. Although it was the dominant school of the nine-
teenth century, the historical school is now of more interest to histo-
rians than to legal scholars. 9 
Both the natural-law and historical schools were dedicated to 
drafting the ideal body of laws, independent of experience. In the 
early twentieth century, however, there arose a new body of 
jurisprudence, oriented toward analyzing the law not as it ought 
to be but as it is. 10 Of course, as there had been no agreement as 
to what the law ought to be, neither has there been agreement as 
to what it is. Under the influence of John Austin, law and morality 
were severed and logic became the life of the law. This formalistic 
view of law dominated Anglo-American thought for 50 years, 11 
until it was challenged by a spawn of the infant social sciences, 
legal realism. Youngest of the jurisprudential schools, legal real-
ism holds that "the life of the law has not been logic; it has been 
experience."12 
The division of jurisprudence into various schools is most help-
ful in the study of law for it necessitates approaching the subject 
from different points of view. Historically, however, these schools 
have been seen by many jurisprudents as competitors, each striving 
for victory over the others. In contrast to the constructive objecti-
vity of the scientific approach, this competition has been primarily 
destructive. The attempt of each school to discredit all others has 
tended to undermine respect for law in general. 
At present, formalism and realism comprise the most active 
jurisprudential schools; 13 the dialogue between them will serve as 
the focus of this article. The formalistic viewpoint is rooted in John 
Austin's analytical positivism, 14 which separated ethical, social and 
political questions from the study of law. 15 The main function of 
9. J. ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 2. 
10. Id. at 2. 
11. J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 3 (1950). 
12. o.w. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
13. A revival of natural law was heralded by some in the late 1950's, bringing ethics back 
into what they felt, in realism, was an overly scientific approach. Jiall, The Present Position 
of Jurisprudence in the United States, 44 VA. L. REV. 321, 323 (1958). This seems a very 
narrow view of the realistic approach-which attempts to incorporate all social disciplines, 
including ethics, into a coherent whole. The inclusion of ethical considerations in jurisprud-
ence is not necessarily a return to natural law (at the expense of legal realism) as realism 
utilizes the abstract approach for analysis only. 
14. J. STONE, supra note 11, at 55. 
15. Bodenheimer, Analytical Positivism, Legal Realism, and the Future of Legal 
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jurisprudence, according to Austin, was the abstraction of princi-
ples, notions and distinctions which were common to developed 
systems of law .16 Although its principles of analysis were derived in 
part from the concepts of Hobbes and Bentham, 17 its method re-
mained strictly logical, describing an internally consistent closed 
system which is enacted or "posited" by a political authority. With 
the exception of the United States, the birthplace of realism, analyt-
ical formalism is still the dominant jurisprudential school in Eng-
land and the former British Empire. 18 In the United States, formal-
istic analysis was initially embraced by many distinguished legal 
scholars, including Dean Langdell and Professor Beale of Harvard. 19 
Speaking for realism was their contemporary, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., who characterized a workable legal system based to-
tally on logic as a myth. He declared that "the logical method and 
form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in 
every human mind."20 The controversy between adherents of the 
two schools simmered within the American legal establishment for 
a quarter of a century before boiling into direct confrontation.21 In 
1931 Dean Pound published a criticism of realism as he saw it, 22 to 
which Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank responded in the best apol-
ogist tradition, alleging misrepresentation and misunderstanding. 23 
Pound's attack allowed realism to state its case. Since then realism 
has been seen by most as coming to the fore in the United States. 
It has recently been said, "realism is dead, we all are realists now, " 24 
and that, in fact, America is in a post-realist period. 25 It is true that 
Method, 44 VA. L. REV. 365, 367-69 (1958). 
16. Id. at 368. 
17. Pound, supra note 8, 50 HARV. L. REV. at 582. 
18. E. PATIERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND loEAS OF THE LAW 84 (1953). 
19. J. ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 3. 
20. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 465 (1897) . Holmes "helped 
undermine the conception that law can be worked out, like pure geometry, from axioms and 
corollaries." J. ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 21. 
21. It was a most confusing confrontation. The confusion was largely created by the 
technique of laying out an opponent's position in one's own terms, then quickly destroying 
the strawman. Compounding the distortion was the unhappy fact that self-definition was 
often speculative and hasty. w. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 74 
379-80 (1973). , 
22. Pound, The Call fora Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931). Pound was 
not a true formalist, but the founder of "sociological jurisprudence," which rejected realism 
as too radical. J. ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 7, 10. 
23. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 1222 (1931). 
24. W. TWINING, supra note 21, at 382. 
25. Hall, supra note 13, at 325. 
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today there are few jurisprudents who would call themselves real-
ists. But this was true even in the 1930's. The power of realism· lies 
in its approach, not in adherence to an historically established set 
of tenets. 26 Although Llewellyn and Frank are no longer alive, their 
interdisciplinary outlook and sceptical rigor generated what is still 
one of the most productive jurisprudential approaches. 
While the United States and Britain are solidly under the influ-
ence of realistic and formalistic approaches respectively, the debate 
remains active in the rest of the world community and within the 
International Court of Justice.27 In so recent a decision as the North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 28 analysts of the Court were able to 
find support for both formalist and realist positions. 29 The realist 
position, however, now seems to be gaining support in the I.C.J. As 
in the United States, this evolution has been laid to the advent of 
the social sciences: 
[T]he Judges now being elected, and likely to be in the future, 
come from a generation of legal scholars which recognizes the signifi-
cance of functional and sociological approaches, and as such are 
determined to bring the Court and the law they are called upon to 
apply up-to-date and suitable for the mid-century world . 30 
III. THE JUDGMENT 
A. Approach 
Neither realism nor formalism is guilty of the excesses that the 
other ascribes to it; realism is not rabidly illogical, nor is formalism 
the ivory tower of reaction. In fact, there is evidence to show that 
these positions are closer together than they have ever been.31 
However, a series of generalizations about both sides32 will be 
26. W. TWINING, supra note 21, at 382. 
27. The I.C.J. is here taken as a representative of the world legal community. Gross, The 
International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing its Role in the 
International Legal Order, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 253, 325-26 (1971). 
28. [1969J l.C.J. 3. 
29. Gross, supra note 27, at 268. 
30. Green, The United Nations, South West Africa and the World Court, 7 INDIAN J. 
INT'L L. 491, 522 (1967), quoted in Gross, supra note 27, at 267-68. 
31. Bodenheimer, supra note 15, at 365. 
32. Realism propounds: (1) law in flux and judicial creation of law; (2) law as a means 
to social ends and not as an end in itself, i.e. judging law by both purpose and effect; 
(3) society in flux, usually at a faster rate than law, implying the constant need for re-
examination; (4) the temporary divorce of "Is" and "Ought" for study purposes, i.e. the 
scientific approach; (5) distrust of traditional legal rules and concepts as able descriptions of 
what courts or people actually do; and (6) distrust of traditional rules of judicial decision-
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provisionally accepted by this Comment as the basic assumptions 
of its analysis, until conclusions can be reached by empirical means. 
Without empirical foundation, the most impeccably reasoned argu-
ment of student or Judge may be without referent, and thus without 
persuasive force. 
B. Analysis 
It is a premise of this Comment that the majority and dissent 
in the Icelandic Fisheries Cases follow the outlines of realism and 
formalism, respectively. 33 There are five major points of conflict 
within the decision. That is to say, there are five issues over which 
the majority and dissent clash.34 They are, in order of treatment: (1) 
making (paper rules), i.e. subjection of these rules to critical scrutiny. Llewellyn, supra note 
23, at 1236-37. This seems to be a fairly rigorous, though artificial, listing of common posi-
tions, taken from the realists of Llewellyn's day. Few of them viewed themselves as belonging 
to any school and several were offended at inclusion, but Llewellyn has not seriously misrepre-
sented anyone, noting, in fact, this anti-group attitude. Less rigorous is a list of the views of 
the formalists who view the law, according to a leading American proponent, Professor J. 
Beale, as "UNIFORM, GENERAL, CONTINUOUS, EQUAL, CERTAIN, PURE." J. 
ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 17. No champion of formalism could be found to attempt a 
detailed self-definition, perhaps because of this (attributed) preference for general over spe-
cific analysis. Militant generality can be seen in the dissenting opinion of Judge Ignacio-
Pinto: 
Perhaps some might even say that the classic conception of international law to 
which I declare allegiance is out-dated; but for myself, I do not fear to continue to 
respect the classic norms of that law. 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] l.C.J . 175, 210. 
Judge Ignacio-Pinto, however, is not too specific about the nature of these norms. 
33. The concurring and dissenting opinions will be treated as united fronts, except where 
otherwise noted. Likewise, the United Kingdom and Federal Republic decisions will be 
treated as fundamentally similar, except on the issue of compensation and where otherwise 
noted. 
34. All of these issues concern the Judgments or their effects. The United Kingdom 
Judgment runs as follows: 
THE COURT, 
by ten votes to four, 
(1) finds that the Regulations concerning the Fishery Limits off Iceland promulgated 
by the Government oflceland on 14July1972 and constituting a unilateral extension 
of the exclusive fishing rights of Iceland to 50 nautical miles from the baselines 
specified therein are not opposable to the Government of the United Kingdom; 
(2) finds that, in consequence, the Government of Iceland is not entitled unilaterally 
to exclude United Kingdom fishing vessels from areas between the fishery limits 
agreed to in the Exchange of Notes of 11 March 1961 and the limits specified in the 
Icelandic Regulations of 14 July 1972, or unilaterally to impose restrictions on the 
activities of those vessels in such areas; 
by ten votes to four, 
(3) holds that the Government of Iceland and the Government of the United King-
dom are under mutual obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith for the 
equitable solution of their differences concerning their respective fishery rights in the 
areas specified in subparagraph 2; 
(4) holds that in these negotiations the Parties are to take into account, inter alia: 
(a) that in the distribution of the fishing resources in the areas specified in 
7
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the legality of Iceland's extension of control of coastal fishing areas 
under international law; (2) the relevance of questions of preferen-
tial treatment and fisheries conservation; (3) the Court's imposition 
of a duty to negotiate upon the parties; (4) the Applicant's claim 
for damages caused by Iceland's assertion of the fisheries extension; 
and (5) the effect of this decision on the contemporaneous Law of 
the Sea Conference. By issue, the dissent and majority strong points 
will be analyzed, indicating which seems most persuasive; that is 
to say, which relies less on polemic over fact-which is less polariz-
ing. 
1. LEGALITY OF THE EXTENSION 
The first point to be considered is one of the most central-the 
duty of the I.C.J. to decide that the fifty-mile extension of jurisdic-
tion over fisheries from baselines around the coast of Iceland is 
subparagraph 2 Iceland is entitled to a preferential share to the extent of the 
special dependence of its people upon the fisheries in the seas around its 
coasts for their livelihood and economic development; 
(b) that by reason of its fishing activities in the areas specified in subpara-
graph 2, the United Kingdom also has established rights in the fishery re-
sources of the said areas on which elements of its people depend for their 
livelihood and economic well-being; 
(c) the obligation to pay due regard to the interests of other States in the 
conservation and equitable exploitation of these resources; 
(d) that the above-mentioned rights of Iceland and of the United Kingdom 
should each be given effect to the extent compatible with the conservation 
and development of the fishery resources in the areas specified in subpara-
graph 2 and with the interests of other States in their conservation and 
equitable exploitation; 
(e) their obligation to keep under review those resources and to examine 
together, in light of scientific and other available information, such measures 
as may be required for the conservation and development, and equitable 
exploitation, of those resources, making use of the machinery established by 
the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention or such other means as may 
be agreed upon as a result of international negotiations. 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Ice-
land), [1974] I.C.J. 3, 34. The Federal Republic Judgment has one additional paragraph: 
by ten votes to four, 
(5) finds that it is unable to accede to the fourth submission of the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 175, 206. 
The fourth submission concerned a request for compensation for interference with the opera-
tions of German fishing vessels by Icelandic patrol boats. 
Present and participating in the proceedings were: President Lachs; Judges (Majority) 
Forster, Bengzon, Dillard, de Castro, Morozov, Jim~nez de Arechaga, Sir Humphrey Wal-
dock, Nagendra Singh, Ruda; (Dissent) Gros, Petren, Onyeama, Ignacio-Pinto; and Registrar 
Aquarone. All judges except Morozov wrote separate opinions. 
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"without foundation in international law and is invalid."35 The ar-
gument put forth by the dissent is that the issue, as defined by the 
parties, 36 is binding upon the Court. The Court should serve, so this 
argument goes, as a sort of Delphic Oracle, only answering questions 
that are put to it. If it fails to answer these questions, which com-
prise the matter at issue, the Court is not fulfilling its proper func-
tion.37 This appears to be a classic formalist position, a conviction 
35. Subparagraph (a) of the conclusion of the United Kingdom Memorial and subpara-
graph 1 of the conclusion of the Federal Republic Memorial. The United Kingdom Memorial 
on the merits was concluded as follows: 
. . . the Government of the United Kingdom submit to the Court that the Court 
should adjudge and declare: 
(a) that the claim by Iceland to be entitled to a zone of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction 
extending 50 nautical miles from baselines around the coast of Iceland is without 
foundation in international law and is invalid; 
( b) that, as against the United Kingdom, Iceland is not entitled unilaterally to assert 
an exclusive fisheries jurisdiction beyond the limits agreed to in the Exchange of 
Notes of 1961; 
(c) that Iceland is not entitled unilaterally to exclude British fishing vessels from the 
area of the high seas beyond the limits agreed to in the Exchange of Notes of 1961 or 
unilaterally to impose restrictions on the activities of such vessels in that area; 
(d) that activities by the Government of Iceland such as are referred to in Part V of 
this Memorial, that is to say, interference by force or the threat of force with British 
fishing vessels operating in the said area of the high seas, are unlawful and that 
Iceland is under an obligation to make compensation therefore to the United King-
dom (the form and amount of such compensation to be assessed, failing agreement 
between the Parties, in such manner as the Court may indicate); and 
(e) that, to the extent that a need is asserted on conservation grounds, supported by 
properly attested scientific evidence, for the introduction of restrictions on fishing 
activities in the said area of the high seas, Iceland and the United Kingdom are under 
a duty to examine together in good faith (either bilaterally or together with other 
interested States and either by new arrangements or through already existing machi-
nery for international collaboration in these matters such as the North-East Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission) the existence and extent of that need and similarly to negoti-
ate for the establishment of such a regime for the fisheries of the area as, having due 
regard to the interests of other States, will ensure for Iceland, in respect of any such 
restrictions that are shown to be needed as aforesaid, a preferential position consis-
tent with its position as a State specially dependent on those fisheries and as will 
also ensure for the United Kingdom a position consistent with its traditional interest 
and acquired rights in and current dependency on these fisheries. 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Ice-
land), [1974] I.C.J. 3, 7. 
The Federal Republic Memorial's conclusion is essentially similar, except for numbering 
versus lettering of the paragraphs. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany 
v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 175, 179. 
36. The United Kingdom and the Federal Republic had all the input, as Iceland did not 
participate. "Iceland has not taken part in any phase of the present proceedings." Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), 
[1974] l.C.J. 3, 8. 
37. [I]t is particularly necessary to satisfy oneself that the Court is passing 
9
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that the legal frame of question-and-answer not only meets the 
needs of the parties, but is in fact the only viable method of 
decision-making, and that the findings of the Court are dictated by 
the expectations of the parties. 
The majority held, in contrast, that the Court is in fact master 
of its own jurisdiction and not controlled by the parties, 38 in line 
with Article 36 of the Statute of the Court. The formalist position 
is certainly guaranteed to satisfy at least one side; but it allows the 
Court no room to exercise judicial notice of any matter not specifi-
cally brought to its attention. The majority, when concluding that 
the state of international law did not yield a definitive statement 
on the fifty-mile limit, noted that a solidification of the law in a time 
of social flux would do the parties more harm than good, 39 by forcing 
them to a stasis while the other countries remained flexible. This is 
the orthodox realist position, that justice in any judicial decision 
can only be obtained by considering all the elements of the situa-
tion, including the consequences of the decision. The majority finds 
support in the Statute of the I.C.J ., Article 53, which allows the 
Court to consider all relevant rules of international law. Article 53 
sets a tone of judicial inquiry outside of the boundaries of the Appli-
cant's pleadings. This authorization, coupled with the United King-
dom's reply to the Court that its request to declare the extension 
against international law per se could be severed from its Memorial 
without injustice, presents the more plausible rationale of the 
two. The Federal Republic was not as congenial as the United 
Kingdom, and did not agree to any such severance. 
2. CONSERVATION AND PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS 
The second point of conflict, which overlaps the first, concerns 
subparagraph (4) of the Judgment, which deals with the finding of 
upon a dispute which has been defined as justiciable by Iceland and the United 
Kingdom, and not some other dispute constructed during consideration of the case 
by the Court. 
Id. at 126 (Gros, J., dissenting). 
38. "[Tjhe Court, as a master of its own jurisdiction, is not controlled by the position 
taken by the Applicants, but is compelled to inquire into the scope of its own jurisdiction 
... . "Id. at 63 (Dillard, J., concurring). 
39. "[Tjhe Judgment ... does not preclude the Parties from benefiting from any 
subsequent developments in the pertinent rules of international law." Fisheries Jurisdiction 
Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 175, 216 (declaration of Nagen-
dra Singh, J.). 
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preferential rights and need for conservation. 40 The dissent argued 
that the Court should not have avoided Applicants' primary plead-
ing. Furthermore, it should not have considered the outside infor-
mation on preferences and conservation, as the Applicants nowhere 
sought a decision on these matters; and thus they were not at 
issue. 41 This is a weak argument, considering subparagraph (e) of 
the United Kingdom's and subparagraph (3) of the Federal Repub-
lic's Memorials, 42 which make these very assertions. The dissent's 
stronger argument is that, regardless of the memorials of the parties, 
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court arose from the 1961 
Exchange of Notes, 43 and the boundaries defined by these notes do 
not include these issues. 44 
This argument does not center on Applicants' desires, but illus-
trates the basic formalist-realist dichotomy. The formalists usually 
look at the structure of the decision, concerned with whether it 
addresses the issues in a traditional manner and whether the proce-
dural essentials are being observed. The realists see the decision's 
consequences as more crucial, emphasizing ends as much as 
means. 45 The end sought here is the settlement of this dispute and 
40. See notes 34-35 supra. 
41. It should be observed that the Applicant has nowhere sought a decision from 
the Court on a dispute between itself and Iceland on the subject of the preferential 
rights of the coastal State, the conservation of fish species, or historic rights . . . . 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 175, 208 
(declaration of Ignacio-Pinto, J.). "[I]t is my view that the Court settled an issue on which 
the Parties were not in dispute." Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3, 164 (Onyeama, J., dissenting). 
42. See note 35 supra. 
43. "[l]t is the 1961 treaty which determines what the subject-matter of the justiciable 
dispute is .... "Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3, 127 (Gros, J., dissenting). 
44. The 1961 Exchange of Notes contained the following provision: " ... in case of a 
dispute relating to [an extension of the fishery jurisdiction of Iceland], the matter shall, at 
the request of either Party, be referred to the International Court of Justice." In his dissenting 
opinion, Judge Gros stated: 
I cannot accept the argument that a form of words as precise as 'dispute in relation 
to the extension of fisheries jurisdiction' can be interpreted as impliedly including 
any connected question . . . if the other Party refused to make that question the 
subject of the agreement itself. The 1961 agreement only contemplated one sort of 
dispute as justiciable, namely the extension of Iceland's fisheries jurisdiction. 
Id. at 127-28. 
45. It [the Court] was not compelled to refer to preferential rights and conser-
vation needs. This I take to be a question of judicial discretion and even prudence. 
But all this does not entail the consequence that it is precluded from dealing with 
the dispute on the broader grounds so earnestly sought by the Applicant. To read 
the Exchange of Notes of 1961 otherwise, that is to say, in a too restrictive fashion, 
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the bringing together of the parties.46 As a matter of policy, if the 
United Kingdom and the Federal Republic want to stipulate to the 
preferential rights of Iceland, in an apparent attempt to negotiate, 
then should the Court not aid them, if its function is the settlement 
of disputes? The realist position here seems the more justifiable, as 
long as the balance of ends and means is maintained. 
As to the jurisdictional argument that these questions are ancil-
lary, 47 the majority reasoning is based on both the history of the 
dispute, 48 which indicates the parties were concerned with these 
issues throughout negotiations, and in the 1961 Exchange of 
Notes, 49 which is not a narrowly drafted document. Between the 
two, dissent and majority, the latter's arguments are more persu-
asive; the dissent has previously stipulated that the Exchange of 
Notes can be used to define jurisdiction, and the boundaries of a 
"dispute in relation to the extension of fisheries jurisdiction around 
Iceland" are broad enough to include all the issues of the contro-
versy. Here the passion of logical positivists, as Austin's followers 
came to be called, for defining their terms shows weakness when 
used as a base in a formalist jurisprudential system. The positivist 
tendency is to narrow all issues to their bare bones, believing impas-
sionately in the maxim that simplicity means clarity and clarity 
means accuracy.50 The dissent has given the 1961 Exchange of Notes 
may have sufficed to decide the immediate issue between the Parties but, in my view, 
it would not have sufficiently sufficed to resolve the dispute by recognizing the 
interests of both Parties and supplying guides for their future conduct . . . . 
Id. at 66 (Dillard, J., concurring). 
46. "[T]he settlement of a dispute . . . is the ultimate objective of all adjudication as 
well as of the United Nations Charter and the Court .... "Id. at 42 (declaration of Nagen-
dra Singh, J.). 
47. "[A]ll the other points in the submissions are only ancillary or consequential to this 
primary claim" that the extension has no basis in international law. Id. at 36 (declaration of 
Ignacio-Pinto, J.). 
48. In the light of the negotiations between the Parties ... it seems evident that 
the dispute between the Parties includes disagreements as to the extent and scope 
of their respective rights in the fishery resources and the adequacy of measures to 
conserve them. It must therefore be concluded that those disagreements are an ele-
ment of the 'dispute in relation to the extension of fisheries jurisdiction around 
Iceland.' 
Id. at 21. 
49. The weakness . . . in the argument which would deny the Court jurisdic-
tional power to respond to this issue is rooted in a too simplistic concept of the nature 
of the dispute .... [T]he dispute covered in the Exchange of Notes is not of [such 
aj clearly delineated character. 
Id. at 66 (Dillard, J., concurring). 
50. For an introduction to the theories of recent logical positivists see A.J. AYER, LAN-
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the narrowest possible construction, and seems to have done so 
incorrectly. 51 
3. DUTY TO NEGOTIATE 
The next point of conflict is the duty to negotiate, 52 which the 
dissent argues is futile and irrelevant. Their argument has several 
parts. First, the 1973 Exchange of Notes53 between the United King-
dom and Iceland has made the Court's order to negotiate moot in 
that case and thus, the Court should not be making ineffective 
gestures. 54 Second, any bilateral duty to negotiate in a situation 
which is essentially multilateral is totally without effect, especially 
in light of the Icelandic agreement with the European Economic 
Community to negotiate fisheries rights with the European nations 
as a group. 55 This second argument presents the dichotomy, often 
espoused by the majority, of immediate resolution versus future 
consequences, 56 but with a twist. This time the dissenting judges 
GUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (2d ed. 1952); LOGICAL POSITIVISM (A.J. Ayer ed. 1959); LOGIC AND 
LANGUAGE (A. Flew ed. 1951). 
51. This is in sharp contrast to the distributive justice (as opposed to corrective or 
remedial justice) advocated by Judge Dillard, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), [1974] l.C.J. 3, 70, which appears to be 
the broadest interpretation possible. Often the best course is avoidance of rigid construction 
rules of any sort. 
52. The question has been raised whether the Court has jurisdiction to pro-
nounce upon certain matters referred to the Court in the last paragraph of the 
Applicant's final submissions . . . to the effect that the parties are under a duty to 
examine together the existence and extent of the need for restrictions of fishing 
activities in Icelandic waters on conservation grounds and to negotiate for the estab-
lishment of such a regime as will, inter alia, ensure for Iceland a preferential position 
consistent with its position as a State specially dependent on its fisheries. 
Id. at 20. 
53. The Exchange of Notes of 1973 included a catch limit, areas of permitted fishing, 
and expiration date of 13November1975. No such agreement was negotiated with the Federal 
Republic. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land v. Iceland), [1974] l.C.J. 3, 17; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Ger-
many v. Iceland), [1974] l.C.J. 175, 188. 
54. "The conclusion of the interim agreement has therefore had the effect of rendering 
the Application of the United Kingdom without object so far as the period covered by the 
agreement is concerned." Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland v. Iceland), [1974] l.C.J. 3, 157 (Petren, J., dissenting). 
55. By finding, in the Judgment, that there is a bilateral obligation to negotiate 
concerning 'respective' rights of a bilateral character, when Iceland has accepted a 
multilateral obligation to negotiate on much wider bases in institutions and interna-
tional bodies which do not come within the purview of the Court's jurisdiction, the 
Court has formulated an obligation which is devoid of all useful application. 
Id. at 141 (Gros, J., dissenting). 
56. "The Court must take into account the situation which will result from the delivery 
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are the ones who most effectively consider future consequences. 
Here, the realist approach is professed more effectively than it is 
practiced. However, the actions of the parties have reinforced the 
majority's decision. Iceland and the United Kingdom have come to 
an agreement which gives breathing space for negotiating a perma-
nent settlement. Should the parties not reach that settlement by 
November of 1975, the authority of the Judgment can be brought 
to bear. The Court, as an extension of the United Nations and an 
instrument of Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, is a tool 
for settling disputes. The fact that occurrences have lessened the 
Court's direct influence over events is no sign that its purpose is 
unachieved. The basis of the Court's jurisdiction to impose this 
requirement to negotiate depends upon the nature of the dispute, 
the nature of the applicable law, 57 and past fisheries treaties.58 
This broad base securely supports the majority position. 
4. QUESTIONS OF COMPENSATION 
The next issue is that of Iceland's duty to pay damages for 
losses it caused Applicants by enforcing the extension. Although the 
United Kingdom chose to drop subparagraph (d) from its Memorial 
as a negotiating concession, 59 the Federal Republic retained its basi-
cally identical subparagraph (4), 60 which was rejected in subpara-
graph (5) of the majority decision. 61 The dissent argued that since 
of its judgment." Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), 
l1974j I.C.J. 175, 202. 
57. [Ijt would appear that in this particular case negotiations appear necessary 
and flow from the nature of the dispute, which is confined to the same fishing grounds 
and relates to issues and problems which best lend themselves to settlement by 
negotiation. Again, negotiations are also indicated by the nature of the law which has 
to be applied, whether it be the treaty of 1961 with its six months' notice in the 
compromissory clause provided ostensibly for negotiations or whether it be reliance 
on considerations of equity. 
Id. at 214 (declaration of Nagendra Singh). 
58. It is not here suggested that each of these (bilateral and multilateral fishing) 
agreements resulted from the application of a prior duty to negotiate . Yet clearly each 
was the consequence of an imperatively felt need to engage in negotiations in order 
to accommodate the conflicting rights of parties. 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Ice-
land), [1974J I.C.J . 3, 68 (Dillard, J., concurring) . 
59. [Ijn view of the conclusion of the interim agreement constituted by the 
Exchange of Notes of 13 November 1973 referred to above, the Government of the 
United Kingdom had decided not to pursue submission (d) of the Memorial. 
Id. at 7. 
60. See note 35 supra. 
61. See note 34 supra. 
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the issue was placed before it, the Court should have granted relief. 62 
The majority found that the Federal Republic presented insufficient 
evidence to substantiate a general finding for an unspecified 
wrong. 63 However, the implications of this decision seem ill-
considered by the majority.64 As Judge Petrtfo points out in his 
dissent, 65 the status of this claim has been left in limbo as far as both 
parties are concerned. The Federal Republic has no guidelines with 
which to redraft its claim, and no specific limit of time for resubmis-
sion; little chance of reconciliation can come of this situation. Here 
again, the decision appears more doctrinaire than reasoned. 
5. JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 
Finally we come to the dissent's charge that the Court is engag-
ing in judicial lawmaking. Although the Court would have made a 
much more explicit statement on the state of international law in 
this area by deciding whether the extension was in violation of inter-
national law per se, the dissent charges that the Court's action will 
unduly influence the outcome of the Conference on the Law of the 
Sea.66 The premise of that charge seems to be that since roughly half 
62. If, as I believe, the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim for compen-
sation, I consider its reasons for rejecting the 'claim wholly inadequate . . . . [T]he 
Federal Republic of Germany was not asking for quantified compensation but for a 
declaration of principle . . . . 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974) I.C.J. 175, 250 
(Onyeama, J., dissenting). 
63. The majority found that: 
In order to award compensation the Court can only act with reference to a concrete 
submission as to the existence and the amount of each head of damage. . . . In these 
circumstances, the Court is prevented from making an all-embracing finding of lia-
bility which would cover matters as to which it has only limited information and 
slender evidence. 
Id. at 204-05. 
Judge Gros was more consistent with the minority position as a whole, however: 
It is therefore because the fourth submission of the Federal Republic fell outside the 
subject matter of the com promissory clause, and therefore of the Court's jurisdiction, 
that it should have been rejected in the Judgment, and not by means of an argument 
based on the way in which the submission was presented. 
Id. at 237. Judge Petren agrees with Judge Gros on this point, noting that: "I ... consider 
that the Federal Republic's compensation claim does not fall within the scope of the jurisdic-
tional clause of the 1961 agreement." Id. at 243. 
64. See notes 55 & 56 supra. 
65. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] l.C.J. 
175, 243. Instead of dismissing, the Court could have called for more information under 
Article 57 of the Rules of the Court. Id. at 250 (Onyeama, J., dissenting). 
66. [I]t causes me some concern also that the majority of the Court seems to 
have adopted the position which is apparent in the present Judgment with the 
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of the United Nations membership ascribes to limits of 12 miles or 
less, the I.C.J.'s holding that 12 miles is not a binding standard in 
international law implies that some wider limit, e.g., 50 or even 200 
miles, is the rule. This argument ignores the fact that the Court 
found that there was no rule at all, 67 but found instead confusion as 
to the present state of the law. 68 At most, the majority holding that 
the Icelandic extension of jurisdiction is not opposable to the United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republic-but not illegal per se-implies 
that 50 miles is only an enforceable limit against those with no 
established rights. 69 It seems reasonable to say that the question is 
still undecided, and no specific limit will be standard until the 
Conference reaches an agreement, perhaps in Geneva. Although 
realism is not averse to judicial law-making, 70 the majority does not 
play a legislative role in this decision. In such a controversial area 
of the law, such caution seems well advised. 
intention of pointing the way for the participants in the Conference on the Law of 
the Sea now sitting in Caracas. 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Ice-
land), [1974] I.C.J. 3, 37 (declaration of Ignacio-Pinto, J.). 
67. Judges Dillard and de Castro reject the "no law" or vacuum theory, on the grounds 
it might allow a country to assert any distance they please (much as the CEP countries have 
done). 
The defeatist idea that the determination of fisheries jurisdiction zones is a 
question of municipal law, within the national competence of each State, must be 
rejected. It is contrary to the principle of the freedom of the high seas .... 
Id. at 96 (Separate Opinion of de Castro, J.). They choose, however, to be satisfied with a 
separate opinion in this matter and to vote with the majority on the grounds that the nature 
of customary international law in this area makes it unnecessary to hold the extension with-
out foundation ipso Jure; that to hold the extension not opposable to the Applicants is 
sufficient. Judge Dillard, id. at 60, distinguishes between a no-rule concept as in the Case of 
the S.S. "Lotus", [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, and an exception to the norms in special 
circumstances as in the (Anglo-Norwegian) Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116, indicating the 
latter precedent applies in this case. 
68. If the dissent is arguing that confusion was the result the Court desired the Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea to reach, then the majority might seem to have been successful, 
as the Conference adjourned without agreement. 
69. 'Although it is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, 
because only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the 
delimitation with regard to other States depends upon international law.' 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Ice-
land), [1974] I.C.J. 3, 22 quoting (Anglo-Norwegian) Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116, 132. 
70. "[A] possibility or even a probability of changes in law or situations in the future 
could not prevent the Court from rendering Judgment today." Fisheries Jurisdiction Case 
(Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 175, 216 (declaration of Nagendra 
Singh, J.). 
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IV. CRITICISMS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. Criticisms 
Scholars have expressed the conviction that as the Court has 
become more progressive, it has in fact retrogressed in terms of 
world authority .71 Looking back to the time when the Permanent 
Court of International Justice reigned as the international tribunal, 
handled a relatively large number of cases, and was bound into the 
world political system by a series of binding compulsory jurisdiction 
agreements, 72 one can see the International Court of Justice as a 
ghost, an overrated advisory committee, seldom used, even by the 
organizations of its parent, the United Nations.73 In taking judicial 
notice of the disparate elements of international law, while empha-
sizing its uniformities, the realists have acted contrary to what the 
formalists feel would best serve the interests of international law. 
As Leo Gross notes in his article on the I. C .J.: 
The proper role for the Court lies in promoting unification in the 
interpretation and application of international law, both customary 
and conventional, and contributing thereby to the rule of law and 
greater integration of the international society.74 
This argument has a great deal of force if one accepts the premise 
that the decline of the Court's influence is due to its having left the 
paths of traditional legal formalism. 
This is not to say that either formalists or realists are arguing 
for the l.C.J. to influence all aspects of international affairs, but 
that "generally the legal aspects of disputes should be resolved by 
legal procedures (adjudication or arbitration) and the political as-
pects by political procedures."75 
The reality of international relations clearly shows that the 
legal ways of peacefully settling international disputes are unac-
ceptable for the solution of disputes arising out of contradictions 
between blocs (Nixon's proposal to refer the Berlin question to the 
71. Gross, supra note 27, at 259. 
72. Out of 130 parties to the Statute of the Court, only 46 have accepted compulsory 
jurisdiction. Out of 54 members of the League of Nations, 38 accepted compulsory jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 262. 
73. Id. at 266-67. 
74. Id. at 259. 
75. Address by Milan Bulajic, World Peace and Peaceful Settlement of International 
Disputes, WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW, THE ATHENS WORLD CONFERENCE 157, 161 (1964) , 
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International Court of Justice), or disputes arising out of the elimi-
nation of colonialism. 76 
199 
The realists are equally vehement in their assertion that the 
Court has not gone far enough in its evolution. They point to legal 
inflexibility as the major problem of the Court in a rapidly changing 
world that responds more to political influences than to legal ones. 
As one commentator has stated, "It does not help that the applica-
tion of a legal rule is legally impeccable if it is politically impossi-
ble."77 Realists see their approach as the more flexible and therefore 
the more conciliatory of the two, and warn that if the dictates of 
realism are not followed, the Court will generally be the worse for 
it: 
[l]f they do not [bring the Court and the law up to date], then 
there is the danger that the Court and the world will split into two 
different schools of international law to the disadvantage of both 
and the further collapse of the rule of law.78 
This prophesy echoes the conviction of arbitration experts that the 
most accurate statement of any dispute is a compromise, due to the 
tendency of both sides to over-emphasize the points most favorable 
to their own case, while ignoring points favorable to the other side.79 
B. Conclusions 
The need for compromise in modern international law seems 
critical. If realist jurisprudence could accomplish the difficult task 
of bringing the alienated CEP countries80 back into the sphere of 
international law through compromise, that alone might prove its 
worth.81 The reluctance of newly liberated nations to accept a body 
of law, which they had no part in creating, is understandable. The 
76. Id. at 160. 
77. Gross, supra note 27, at 267. 
78. Green, supra note 30. 
79. Any notion or opinion which postulates extreme positions-whatever may be 
the underlying purpose or motive-is incompatible and irreconcilable with the idea 
of securing the recognition and adequate legal protection of all the legitimate inter-
ests involved. 
Garcia, Report on Responsibility of the State for Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person 
or Property of Aliens-Reparation of the Injury, [1961) 2 Y.B. lNT'L L. CoMM'N Add. 1, at 
46, U.N. Doc. NCN. 4/Ser. A Add. 1/46 (1961). 
80. Although sometimes arranged in different order elsewhere, the initials CEP are used 
here to indicate Chile, Equator, Peru and all other countries that have enforced a 200 mile 
coastal limit. 
81. 1 8. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 15 (1961). 
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present law makes few distinctions between developed and develop-
ing countries, distinctions which the newer countries feel are essen-
tial to participation in the international legal system.82 The most 
viable position undoubtedly lies between the two extremes. For ex-
ample, the dissenting opinions of Judge Gros in the Icelandic Fish-
eries Cases are often more empirically rigorous than the opinions of 
the realists. Judge Dillard, in tum, shows a good example to the 
formalists, carefully reviewing and refuting their arguments in a fair 
manner. However, elsewhere in the decision high polemic appears 
to be the rule. 83 
The tendency to characterize the actions of others in polemic 
rather than objective terms is not confined to this court. Jurispru-
dents in general seem to indulge this tendency, often to the detri-
ment of the Court. 
A tribunal which boldly strikes out in new directions will be accused 
of lack of predictability, but a tribunal which applies the law as it 
finds it, and fosters "stability of law and predictability of outcome" 
of international litigation may "fall soon into disuse and sterility. " 84 
Or, to put it more simply, "One may either hulloo on the inevitable, 
and be called a bloodthirsty progressive; or one may try to gain time 
and be called a bloodthirsty reactionary. "85 Although some blame 
can be laid on others in this matter, the Court has a responsibility 
to do as much as possible to aid its own image. The question of the 
Court's image is a critical one to the future of international law, 
with the I.C.J. as the principal judicial organ. Its self-described task 
is to "ensure respect for international law."88 It can do this not only 
by its decisions but by its demeanor. 87 
Jurisprudential combativeness seems to have been taken for 
granted as an inevitable and necessary element of the science. But 
today this attitude seems self-indulgent, and, at this stage of the 
world's development, impossible to sustain. The sources of this fal-
lacy of necessity are multiple. One is a misunderstanding of the 
basic nature of the division of jurisprudence into schools. The var-
82. WORLD PEACE, supra note 75, at 163. 
83. Especially polemical were the dissent of Judge Ignacio-Pinto and the joint separate 
opinion of Judges Forster, Bengzon, Jimenez de Arechaga, Nagendra Singh and Ruda. 
84. Gross, supra note 27, at 254. 
85. D. SAYERS, GAUDY NIGHT 339 (1936). 
86. Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 1, 35. 
8
1
7. S. RosENNE, supra note 81, at 47. 
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ious jurisprudential theories should not be viewed as in opposition 
simply because they are looking at different aspects of law. None 
tries to explain fully what law is, but each speaks with a different 
emphasis. To quote William Twining: 
At the root of such misunderstandings has been the tendency to 
treat all legal theories as comparables, because they fall within the 
sphere of 'jurisprudence.'88 
Realism is concerned with the problems of adaptation to changed 
conditions, while formalism struggles with the problems of unifica-
tion of the law. The idea of form versus function is a destructive 
dichotomy, as both are essential. The whole realistic reaction 
against formalism in America was originally a reaction against how 
the law was being taught in the United States. Langdell, the father 
of American legal education and the case method, had selected one 
necessary element of a successful lawyer and treated it as if it were 
the only one.89 But regardless of original motives, in the polemic that 
raged in the U.S. legal establishment of the 1930's, both sides 
seemed to advertise themselves as the be-all and end-all, and totally 
rejected the validity of the other position. This, very possibly, is 
happening in the International Court of Justice. 
Another source of the fallacy of necessity is a self-indulgent 
attitude on the part of many jurisprudents, who fail to discipline 
themselves to objectivity: 
Of all legal subjects, jurisprudence is the most susceptible to 
controversy; juristic controversies are prone to be inconclusive and 
unsatisfactory; of juristic controversies, that surrounding realism 
had more than its share of slovenly scholarship, silly misunderstan-
dings and jejune polemics. 90 
While the reasons for this are complex,91 it is a sad fact that "writers 
88. W. TWINING, supra note 21, at 172. 
89. Id. at 18. 
90. Id. at 80. 
91. Llewellyn's view was that: 
.. . (a) jurisprudes are mostly lawyers, so trained in the rhetoric of controversy, with: 
(i) its selective, favorable posing of issues, and (ii) it selection, coloring, argumenta-
tive arrangement of facts, and (iii) its use of epithet and innuendo, and (iv) its typical 
complete distortion of the advocate's vision, once he has taken a case, so that he 
ceases to even take in any possibility which would work against him (as especially 
in the prevalent 'romantic' type of advocacy) that, (b) it has proved necessary to 
police their work as advocates by (i) forcing them to define issues by a careful system 
of phrased pleading, served back and forth with opportunity for answer, under the 
supervision of a responsible and authoritative tribunal, and (ii) limiting their argu-
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profess various jurisprudential faiths which have come into 
labels, ... labels which seem to have become rather more combat-
ive than descriptive."92 Affecting both their self-image and their 
view of others, it is this kind of labeling which often polarizes what 
otherwise could be productive discussion. 
It seems obvious that a new orientation is necessary. Warring 
jurisprudential disciplines must be reconciled. It has already been 
noted that the two disciplines of realism and formalism have grown 
closer together during the past few years. Most of this rapproach-
ment has been on the part of analytical formalism, evidenced by a 
semantic and conceptual scepticism; 93 no longer is the possibility of 
a consistent legal system without input from other disciplines taken 
for granted. Now, it is realism that must make the gesture of recon-
ciliation. It has always been formalism which has feared legal chaos, 
perhaps overly so, while realism accepted it as a fact. 94 This realistic 
attitude of cynical observation can no longer be of service; "realism 
is hard work. " 95 "One of the main lessons to be drawn from the story 
of the realist movement is that it is easy to ignore or to underesti-
mate the difficulties, theoretical and practical, of sustained inter-
disciplinary work."96 
In terms of classical realism, the fact-scepticism of Jerome 
Frank must be exchanged for the rule-scepticism of Llewellyn.97 
Fact-scepticism accepts and analyzes the personal element in judi-
cial decision-making without presenting an outline for achieving a 
true science of decision, i.e. a theory which incorporates the infor-
ments to issues so drawn, and (iii) confining the 'facts' to which they can resort to a 
record, and (iv) barring guilt by association, or by imputation, or without proof of 
particular offense etc., yet, (c) in Jurisprudence every man (i) states his own issue, 
misstates the other man's issue, beclouds the or-any issue, evades the or-any issue, 
etc., uncontrolled by procedure or by answer, or by authority (and cases where a 
jurisprude has stated an issue fairly are museum-pieces), and (ii) uses his rhetoric 
also without control, and (iii) is free to dream up 'facts' even by anonymous imputa-
tion, and (iv) consequently always rides his strawman down. 
(d) Whereas in law one party always loses, or each must yield something, in 
Jurisprudence there is thus Triumphant Victory for All. This makes for comfort, if 
not for light. 
W. TWINING, supra note 21, at 379-80. 
92. Llewellyn, One "Realist 's" View of Natural Law for Judges, 15 NOTRE DAME LAW 3, 
8 (1939) . 
93. Bodenheimer, supra note 15, at 371. 
94. Id. at 375. 
95. W. TWINING, supra note 21, at 59. 
96. Id. at 386-87. 
97. J. ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 14. 
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mal sources of law. Frank argued that "a definition of law in terms 
of rules obfuscates clear thinking about law,"98 and that "the major 
cause of legal uncertainty [is] not that of rule but of fact." 99 How-
ever, fact-scepticism was more concerned with the personal interac-
tion in a local trial court. In the rarified atmosphere of the I.C.J., 
where much of the pleading is done at some distance, the rule-
scepticism search for principles of decision behind the "paper rules" 
of a court is a valid one. 100 
Until these problems are faced, by both realism and formalism, 
petty bickering will stifle the true growth of international law, espe-
cially in the world court. As Judge Gros stated in his dissenting 
opinion, "[t]he real task of the Court is still to 'decide in accord-
ance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it.' " 101 
lgP--oring the formalist overtones, this general statement underlines 
the role of the I.C.J. in the world community-developing a unified 
body of international law that is broadly acceptable. Combining 
this broad acceptability with rigorous empiricism is a difficult goal 
-one most worthy of achievement. 
Timothy C. Mack 
98. Id. at 21. 
99. Id. at 24-25. 
100. Id. at 14. 
101. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 
175, 238 (Gros, J., dissenting). 
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